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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Pro-life legislation has been at the forefront of Ohio’s political 
agenda for 2011.  With newly elected Republican governor John 
Kasich,1 a Republican dominated Ohio House of Representatives,2 and a 
Republican dominated Ohio Senate,3 several pro-life bills have been 
 
 1.  About: John R. Kasich Governor of Ohio, OHIO.GOV (2012), 
http://governor.ohio.gov/About/GovernorKasich.aspx. 
 2.  Members Displayed by Name, WELCOME TO THE OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF 
THE 129TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2012), http://www.house.state.oh.us/
index.php?option=com_displaymembers&Itemid=57. 
 3.  The Ohio Senate, THE 129TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OHIO SENATE MEMBERS (2012) 
http://www.ohiosenate.gov/directory.html. 
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considered, debated, and passed by the Ohio legislature and ultimately 
signed into law. 
For example, H.B. 78/S.B.72, The Viable Infants Protection Act,4 is 
currently pending in the Ohio Senate.  The Viable Infants Protection Act 
prohibits an abortion after twenty weeks if the physician determines that 
the fetus is “viable.”5  “Viability” means that the physician determines 
that the fetus is capable of life outside the womb.6  H.B. 298/S.B. 201,7 
referred to as the “Defund Planned Parenthood Act”8 by pro-life 
supporters, re-prioritizes federal family planning dollars distributed to 
state health centers that promote “family planning services.”9  This bill 
would have the practical effect of allocating federal funds to 
organizations like Planned Parenthood last.10 
In June 2011, Governor Kasich signed into law H.B. 153, which 
 
 4.  S.B. 72, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at http://
www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_SB_72_PS_Y.pdf. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. (as used in sections 2919.16 to 2919.18 of the Ohio Revised Code.  Sec. 2919.16(M) 
defines “viable” as “the stage of development of a human fetus at which in the determination of a 
physician, based on the particular facts of a woman’s pregnancy that are known to the physician and 
in light of medical technology and information reasonably available to the physician, there is a 
realistic possibility of the maintaining and nourishing of a life outside of the womb with or without 
temporary artificial life-sustaining support.”). 
 7.  H.B. 298, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_298_I_Y.pdf; S.B. 201, 129th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/
129_SB_201_I_Y.pdf. 
 8.  Peter J. Smith, Ohio Lawmakers Seek to Defund Planned Parenthood, Fund Public 
Health Centers, LIFESITENEWS.COM (July 13, 2011), available at http://www.lifesitenews.com/
news/ohio-lawmakers-seek-to-defund-planned-parenthood-fund-public-health-centers/. 
 9.  H.B. 298/S.B. 201, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacting O.R.C. 
3701.033 (A) All funds distributed by the department of health for the purpose of providing family 
planning services, including funds the department receives through the “Maternal and Child Health 
Block Grant,” Title V of the “Social Security Act,” 95 Stat. 818 (1981), 42 U.S.C. 701, as amended, 
and through Title X of the “Public Health Service Act,” 84 Stat. 1504 (1970), 42 U.S.C. 300a, as 
amended, shall be awarded as follows: (1) The department shall award funds with foremost priority 
given to eligible public entities that provide family planning services, including community health 
clinics and similar health facilities operated by state, county, or local government entities. (2) To the 
extent funds are available after the department determines that all eligible public entities have been 
fully funded under division (A)(1) of this section, the department may award funds to nonpublic 
entities in the following order of descending priority: (a) Federally qualified health centers, as 
defined in section 3701.047 of the Revised Code; (b) Nonpublic entities that provide comprehensive 
primary and preventive care services in addition to family planning services; (c) Nonpublic entities 
that provide family planning services, but do not provide comprehensive primary and preventive 
care services.). 
 10.  Id.; see also Ohio Right to Life Renews Effort to Defund Planned Parenthood, OHIO 
RIGHT TO LIFE (May 16, 2012, 3:39 PM), http://www.ohiolife.org/press-releases/2012/5/16/ohio-
right-to-life-renews-effort-to-defund-planned-parenthoo.html. 
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bans the performance of abortions in public hospitals and prohibits 
abortion coverage in insurance plans for public employees.11  H.B. 153 
also requires the Ohio Department of Health to apply for federal 
abstinence education grants.12  In November of 2011, Governor Kasich 
also signed into law H.B. 63/S.B. 8, which increased the evidentiary 
standard for minors’ knowledge regarding abortions.13  Effective 
February 2012, when a minor seeks an abortion, the juvenile court must 
determine by “clear and convincing evidence” that “the minor is 
sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide intelligently 
whether to have an abortion.”14  In December 2011, Governor Kasich 
signed into law H.B. 79, which excludes abortion coverage from the 
State Exchange, which Ohio must create as required by the new federal 
health care law introduced by President Barack Obama.15  Additionally, 
states throughout the country are attempting to pass similar pro-life 
legislation, including Mississippi, South Dakota, and Colorado, among 
many others. 
Perhaps the most controversial piece of pro-life legislation 
introduced in 2011 is Ohio’s H.B. 125,16 commonly referred to as “The 
Heartbeat Bill.”17  If passed into law, H.B. 125 would require physicians 
 
 11.  Am. Sub. H.B. 153, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_153_EN_N.html.  For final analysis, see 
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses129/11-hb153-129.pdf. 
 12.  Id. (OHIO. REV. CODE. § 3701.0211 enacted to read as follows, “Sec. 3701.0211.  For 
each year that federal funds are made available to states under Title V of the ‘Social Security Act,’ 
124 Stat. 352 (2010), 42 U.S.C. 710, as amended, for use in providing abstinence education, the 
director of health shall submit to the United States secretary of health and human services an 
application for the allotment of those funds that is available to this state.  The director shall use the 
funds received in accordance with any conditions under which the application was approved.”). 
 13.  Am. H.B. 63, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_63_EN_N.pdf.; S.B. 8, 129th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/
129_SB_8_I_Y.pdf. 
 14.  H.B. 63; S.B. 8 (enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.121(C)(3) “If the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the minor is sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide 
intelligently whether to have an abortion, the court shall grant the petition and permit the minor to 
consent to the abortion.”). 
 15.  Am. H.B. 79, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted) available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_79_EN_N.pdf (enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 
3901.87(A) “No qualified health plan shall provide coverage for a nontherapeutic abortion. (B) As 
used in this section: (1) “Nontherapeutic abortion” has the same meaning as in section 124.85 of the 
Revised Code. (2) “Qualified health plan” means any qualified health plan as defined in section 
1301 of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” 42 U.S.C. 18021, offered in this state 
through an exchange created under that act.”). 
 16.  Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_125_PH_Y.pdf. 
 17.  The Heartbeat Bill: If the Heartbeat is Detected, the Baby is Protected, THE HEARTBEAT 
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to check the fetus of a pregnant woman for a “heartbeat.”18  If the fetus 
has any detectable cardiac activity, the physician is required to inform 
the woman in writing, and the woman must sign a form acknowledging 
that the fetus has cardiac activity.19  Additionally, if the fetus is found to 
have cardiac activity, the woman is banned from having an abortion 
unless it is a medical emergency.20 
H.B. 125 does not have a rape exception, which means that women 
who conceived through violence would be required to proceed to term 
with the fetus if the fetus is older than just a few weeks.21  H.B. 125 also 
subjects physicians to discipline if the physician fails to determine if the 
fetus has a detectable cardiac activity.22  Naturally, the introduction of a 
bill this controversial attracted local and national media attention.23 
 
BILL, http://www.heartbeatbill.com/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012); Aaron Marshall, Ohio Senate 
Republicans Plan to Move ‘Heartbeat’ Bill, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 25, 2011, 7:25 PM), available 
at http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/11/senate_republicans_planning_to.html; Darrel 
Rowland, Ohio Voters Evenly Split on ‘Heartbeat Bill,’ THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 19, 2012, 
2:08 PM), available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/01/19/quinnipiac-poll-
heartbeat-bill-fracking.html. 
 18.  H.B. 125 (enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.19(A)(2) “‘Fetal heartbeat’ means cardiac 
activity or the steady and repetitive rhythmic contraction of the fetal heart within the gestational 
sac . . . . (C)(1) Except when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with this 
division, no person shall perform an abortion on a pregnant woman prior to determining if the fetus 
the pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable fetal heartbeat.”). 
 19.  Id. (enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.19(D)(2) “If the person who intends to perform an 
abortion on a pregnant woman detects a fetal heartbeat in the unborn human individual that the 
pregnant woman is carrying, no later than twenty-four hours prior to the performance of the 
intended abortion, both of the following apply: (a) The person intending to perform the abortion 
shall inform the pregnant woman in writing that the unborn human individual that the pregnant 
woman is carrying has a fetal heartbeat and shall inform the pregnant woman . . . to the best of the 
person’s knowledge. . .the statistical probability of bringing the unborn human individual to 
term . . . (b) The pregnant woman shall sign a form acknowledging that the pregnant woman has 
received information from the person intending to perform the abortion that the unborn human 
individual that the pregnant woman is carrying has a fetal heartbeat . . . .”). 
 20.  Id. (enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.19(C)(1) “Except when a medical emergency exists 
that prevents compliance with this division, no person shall perform an abortion on a pregnant 
woman prior to determining if the fetus of the pregnant woman is carrying a detectable fetal 
heartbeat.  Any person who performs an abortion on a pregnant woman based on the exception in 
this division shall note in the pregnant woman’s medical records that a medical emergency 
necessitating the abortion existed.”). 
 20.  Id. (enacting Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.19(A)(6) “Cardiac activity means a biologically 
indefinable moment in time, normally when the fetal heartbeat is formed in the gestational sac.”). 
 21.  Id.  See also Al Gerhardstein, Opposition Testimony to HB 125 (Mar. 9, 2011), 
http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Gerhardstein.pdf. 
 22.  H.B. 125 (enacting O.R.C. 2919.19(C)(4) “If a physician performs an abortion on a 
pregnant woman prior to determining if the fetus the pregnant woman is carrying has a detectable 
fetal heartbeat, the physician is subject to disciplinary action . . . .”). 
 23.  Stephanie Condon, Abortion battles spring up nationwide as states test the limits of Roe 
v. Wade, CBSNEWS (Mar. 21, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-
4
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This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
controversial H.B. 125 under the Fourteenth and First Amendments to 
the United States Constitution in the context of current United States 
Supreme Court precedent.  Part II outlines Ohio’s current abortion laws, 
describes Ohio’s role in creating anti-abortion legislation and case law, 
provides a context of other abortion bills occurring nationwide, and 
explains H.B. 125.  Part III analyzes how H.B. 125 is unconstitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in its current form, analyzes its 
constitutionality if the bill was modified to be a consent-only bill, and 
analyzes its unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment in light of Supreme Court precedent addressing 
abortion. 
II. THE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL PUSH FOR PRO-LIFE LAWS 
A. Ohio’s Current Abortion Laws & Ohio as the Catalyst of Informed 
Consent Provisions 
In Ohio, abortion is defined as “the purposeful termination of a 
human pregnancy by any person, including the pregnant woman herself, 
with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead 
fetus or embryo.”24  Absent certain exceptions, after a fetus is viable, 
abortion procedures are prohibited.25  Viability is defined as “the stage 
in development of a human fetus at which in the determination of a 
physician . . . there is a realistic possibility of the maintaining and 
nourishing of a life outside of the womb with or without temporary 
artificial life-sustaining support.”26  After twenty-two weeks, abortions 
are prohibited unless the fetus is not viable.27 
Like many states, Ohio also mandates that the woman seeking an 
abortion wait a specified period of time and receive certain information 
prior to an abortion procedure in order to ensure that the woman’s choice 
 
20044823-503544.html; Erik Eckholm, Anti-Abortion Groups Are Split on Legal Tactics, N.Y 
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/health/policy/fetal-
heartbeat-bill-splits-anti-abortion-forces.html?_r=2&ref=ohio; Catherine Candisky, Ohio House 
Approves Anti-Abortion Bills, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/06/28/ohio-house-approves-heartbeat-bill.html; 
Ann Sander, Abortion Foes Push Fetal Heartbeat Bills in States, MSNBC (Oct. 12, 2011, 3:31:17 
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44879242/ns/politics-more_politics/t/abortion-foes-push-fetal-
heartbeat-bills-states/#.TyL1N5ibLNY. 
 24.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.11 (West 2012). 
 25.  Id. § 2919.17(A). 
 26.  Id. § 2919.16(M). 
 27.  Id. § 2919.18(A)(1). 
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to have an abortion is informed.  These laws are frequently dubbed 
“informed consent provisions.”28  Ohio, and particularly the city of 
Akron, was the catalyst for many of the nation’s informed consent 
provisions. 
In 1983, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health29 
examined the constitutionality of laws designed to prevent a woman 
from obtaining an abortion absent the recognition of certain 
information.30  The ordinances: mandated that an abortion could only be 
performed in a hospital setting; required a pregnant woman to wait 
twenty-four hours prior to receiving an abortion to deliberate over the 
decision; required the physician to inform the woman about the 
development of the fetus, the status of her pregnancy, physical and 
emotional complications that may result from pregnancy; and required 
the physician to give the woman a list of agencies that can assist the 
woman with adoption and childbirth.31  The City of Akron argued that 
providing a woman with this information was part of the “informed 
consent” process because it made her decision to have an abortion more 
informed, and these ordinances protected the life of the woman.32 
Although the United States Supreme Court held Akron’s 
ordinances unconstitutional,33 the Supreme Court reconsidered similar 
ordinances in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey34 and found certain informed consent provisions constitutional.35  
 
 28.  Christine L. Raffaele, Validity of State “Informed Consent” Statutes by Which Providers 
of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient Seeking Abortion with Certain Information, 119 
A.L.R.5TH 315 (2004). 
 29.  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 30.  Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 421-23. 
 31.  Id. at 421-23.  Just four years previously, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio found these Akron ordinances unconstitutional in Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172.  The district court held unconstitutional 
the “truly informed consent” provisions of the ordinance, which required the physician to give the 
pregnant woman a detailed description of the “anatomical and physiological characteristics of the 
particular unborn child . . . .”  Id. at 1203.  The court reasons this provision violated the woman’s 
right to privacy and went “far beyond what is permissible in pursuance of [the State’s] interest.”  Id. 
 32.  Akron Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 442. 
 33.  Id. at 421-23. 
 34.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 35.  Id. at 881.  See also, TRACY A. THOMAS, JUSTICE & LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF 
LAKE ERIE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OHIO 20-21 (Paul 
Finkelman & Roberta Alexander, eds. 2012).  Tracy A. Thomas is Professor of Law at The 
University of Akron School of Law.  She teaches Remedies, Women’s Legal History, and Family 
Law.  Professor Thomas received her B.A. degree from Miami University and J.D. degree from 
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, where she was the production editor of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal.  Professor Thomas is the co-editor of 
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In Casey, a twenty-four hour waiting period36 and a statute that required 
the pregnant woman to receive certain information, including 
information about adoption and childbirth, were held constitutional.37  
Since Casey, Ohio has enacted many informed consent provisions 
designed to “ensure that the woman’s choice is informed” and “designed 
to . . . persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”38 
After the Casey decision, Ohio immediately enacted a law requiring 
a twenty-four hour waiting period originally introduced in Akron 
Reproductive Health.  Then, Mississippi39 and Pennsylvania quickly 
enacted a twenty-four hour waiting period.40  In the mid to late 1990’s, 
eight states also enacted waiting periods as part of their informed 
consent laws: Indiana,41 Kansas,42 Kentucky,43 Louisiana,44 Michigan,45 
Nebraska,46 Utah,47 and Wisconsin.48  In the 2000’s, eight more states 
enacted twenty-four hour waiting periods: Alabama,49 Georgia,50 
Idaho,51 Minnesota,52 Missouri,53 Oklahoma,54 Texas,55 and Virginia.56  
More recently, in 2010, both West Virginia57 and South Carolina58 
 
FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND LAW (Tracy A. Thomas & Tracey Jean 
Boisseau eds., NYU Press 2011).  She is currently at work on a book about Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
and the Feminist Foundations of Family Law under contract with NYU Press.  Available at 
http://www.uakron.edu/law/faculty/profile.dot?identity=700609. 
 36.  505 U.S. at 885. 
 37.  Id. at 881. 
 38.  Id. at 878.  See also Jennifer Y. Seo, Raising the Standard of Abortion Informed Consent: 
Lessons to Be Learned from the Ethical and Legal Requirements for Consent to Medical 
Experimentation, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 359-60 (2011) (arguing that informed consent 
provisions constitute informational manipulation). 
 39.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33(1)(a) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 982 took effect in 1991). 
 40.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205(a)(1) (West 2012). 
 41.  IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1) (West 2012) (S.E.A. No. 311 enacted in 1995). 
 42.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a) (West 2012) (S.B. 204 enacted in 1997). 
 43.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725(1)(a) (West 2012) (H.B. 85 enacted in 1998). 
 44.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(3) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 2246 enacted in 
1995). 
 45.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17014(h) (West 2012) (S.B. No. 384 enacted in 1994). 
 46.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327(2) (West 2012) (L.B. 110 enacted in 1993). 
 47.  UTAH CODE. ANN. § 76-7-305(2)(a) (West 2012) (S.B. 60 enacted in 1993). 
 48.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(3)(c)(1) (West 2012) (A.B. 441 enacted in 1995). 
 49.  ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(a) (West 2012) (S.B. No. 33 enacted in 2002). 
 50.  GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3(1) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 197 enacted in 2005). 
 51.  IDAHO CODE. ANN. § 18-609(4) (West 2012) (S.B. No. 1299 enacted in 2000). 
 52.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242(a)(2) (West 2012) (S.F. No. 187 enacted in 2003). 
 53.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.039(2) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 156 effective in 2003). 
 54.   OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.2(B)(2) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 1686 effective in 
2005). 
 55.  TEX. CODE. ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (Vernon 2012) (H.B. No. 15 effective in 2003). 
 56.  VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-76(B)(5) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 1833 enacted in 2003). 
 57.  W.VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2I-2(b) (West 2012) (S.B. No. 597 enacted in 2010). 
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enacted the waiting period, and in 2011 North Carolina59 enacted a 
waiting period despite the governor’s veto. 
South Dakota is in the process of attempting to pass the nation’s 
most conservative waiting period, requiring women to wait seventy-two 
hours prior to an abortion.60  A federal judge granted a preliminary 
injunction to prohibit the waiting period from going into effect because 
it is likely unconstitutional under current Supreme Court precedent.61  
Because South Dakota only has one abortion clinic in the entire state,62 
implementing a seventy-two hour waiting period may mean that a 
woman must wait an entire month between her first consultation and the 
abortion procedure if the same doctor is required to perform both the 
consultation and the procedure.63 
In addition to the waiting period, Ohio takes additional measures to 
ensure that the woman’s choice is “informed” or “persuaded.”64  Ohio 
mandates that a pregnant woman receive certain information designed to 
affect her abortion decision.  For example, the woman must receive 
materials that include information designed to discourage her from 
having an abortion and encourage her to pursue “family planning.”65  
This information that the State is required to give “describe[s] the 
embryo or fetus” and “list[s] agencies that offer alternatives to 
abortion.”66  Additionally, this information must be provided in-person 
and must take place before the twenty-four hour waiting period begins.67 
B. New Mechanisms for Pushing the Legal Boundaries of Informed 
Consent 
Since Akron Reproductive Health and Casey, states have found new 
methods to ensure “informed consent” prior to an abortion procedure.  
Requiring the performance of an ultrasound on the patient’s uterus prior 
 
 58.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330(D) (West 2012) (H.B. 3245 enacted in 2010). 
 59.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.82(1) (West 2012) (H.B. 854 enacted in 2011). 
 60.  S.D. Codified Laws §34-23A-56 (2012). 
 61.  Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 
2d 1048 (D.S.D. 2011). 
 62.  Id. at 1065. 
 63.  Id. at 1064.  Additionally, the district court examined the geographic distances the 
women would be required to travel, the financial burdens, the effect the waiting period would have 
on the woman’s choice to a surgical or non-surgical abortion, and the impact it would have on 
women who are victims of abuse.  Id. at 1065. 
 64.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
 65.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(C) (West 2012). 
 66.  Id. § 2317.56(B)(2)(c). 
 67.  Id. § 2317.56(B)(1)&(2). 
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to an abortion procedure is yet another way states are allegedly ensuring 
that “the woman’s choice is informed.”68  Ultrasounds are commonly 
used during pregnancy to examine the fetus and provide a physical 
picture of the fetus.69  Although Ohio did not pioneer the use of 
ultrasounds, the legal arguments that are made in their support can be 
traced to Akron Reproductive Health, the catalyst of informed consent 
provisions. 
In 1996, Utah was the first state to introduce the use of an 
ultrasound as a prerequisite to having an abortion.70  In the late 1990’s, 
Louisiana also followed suit and in the 2000’s, seventeen states also 
enacted ultrasound laws: Alabama,71 Arizona,72 Arkansas,73 Florida,74 
Georgia,75 Idaho,76 Indiana,77 Kansas,78 Michigan,79 Mississippi,80 
Nebraska,81 North Dakota,82 Ohio,83 Oklahoma,84 South Carolina,85 
West Virginia,86 and Wisconsin.87 
However, not all ultrasound laws have remained unchallenged.  In 
2011, Texas introduced H.B. 15, a bill that would require an ultrasound 
to be performed prior to an abortion procedure.88  In addition to 
mandating the use of an ultrasound and requiring the image to be shown 
to the pregnant woman, the law would also require that the physician 
that performs the ultrasound provide a verbal interpretation of the 
 
 68.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.  See also Carol Sanger, Seeing is Believing: Mandatory 
Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008) (arguing that the use 
of ultrasounds has become a mechanism in the law to deter women from having abortions). 
 69.  Definition of Pregnancy Ultrasound, MEDICINE NET.COM (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=9509. 
 70.  UTAH CODE. ANN. §76-7-305(3)(d)(6) (West 2012) (H.B. 222 enacted in 1996). 
 71.  ALA. CODE §26-23A-4(b)(4) (West 2012) (S.B. No. 333 enacted in 2002). 
 72.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2156(A)(1)(b) (West 2012) (H.B. 2416 enacted in 2011). 
 73.  ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-16-602 (West 2012) (S.B. 729 enacted in 2003). 
 74.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(b) (West 2012) (C.S.H.B. 1127 enacted in 2011). 
 75.  GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3(4) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 147 enacted in 2007). 
 76.  IDAHO CODE. ANN. § 18-609(5) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 248 enacted in 2007). 
 77.  IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(3) (West 2012) (S.E.A. No. 76 enacted in 2005). 
 78.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(h) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 2035 enacted in 2011). 
 79.  MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 333.17015(8) (West 2012) (H.B. No. 4446 enacted in 2006). 
 80.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (West 2012) (S.B. No. 2391 enacted in 2007). 
 81.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327(2)(e)&(3) (West 2012) (L.B. 675 enacted in 2009). 
 82.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-07 (West 2012) (H.B. No. 345 enacted in 2009). 
 83.  OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.561 (West 2012) (H.B. No. 314 enacted in 2008). 
 84.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (West 2012) (H.B. No. 2780 enacted in 2010) 
 85.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330(A) (2012) (H.B. No. 3355 enacted in 2008). 
 86.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-2I-2(b)(4) (West 2012) (S.B. No. 597 enacted in 2010). 
 87.  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(d)(1)&(g) (West 2012). 
 88.  H.B. 15, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011), available at 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82R/senateamendana/pdf/HB00015A.pdf#navpanes=0. 
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ultrasound image, the presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of 
organs.89  Additionally, the physician is required to “make audible the 
heart auscultation” and provide a verbal explanation of what the 
auscultation means.90 
A class of plaintiffs, collectively known as “Texas Medical 
Providers Providing Abortion Services” challenged the law in district 
court, seeking an injunction.91  The district court determined that three 
portions of the statute were unconstitutionally vague92 and held that the 
compelled speech requirements upon the physicians were 
unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment, thus resulting in the 
injunction being granted in part.93  On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court and vacated the preliminary 
injunction reasoning that the plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate 
constitutional flaws in H.B. 15” and accordingly could not prove a 
likelihood of success on the First Amendment and vagueness claims.94 
Ohio’s H.B. 125 would seek to push these informed consent 
provisions to an entirely new level. 
C. The National Push for Pro-Life Legislation 
In addition to Ohio, many states have considered drastic pro-life 
measures in 2011.  Mississippi introduced Initiative 26, commonly 
referred to as the “Personhood Amendment.”95  Initiative 26 was an 
attempt to change the definition of a person under the Mississippi State 
Constitution.96  The one sentence amendment to the state’s constitution 
would read: “The term ‘person’ or ‘persons’ shall include every human 
 
 89.  Id. (amending TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE. ANN. § 171.012(B) “the physician who is 
to perform the abortion displays the sonogram images in a quality consistent with current medical 
practice in a manner that the pregnant woman may view them; (C) who is to perform the abortion 
provides, in a manner understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of the results of the 
sonogram images, including a medical description of the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the 
presence of cardiac activity, and the presence of external members and internal organs . . . .”). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Serv.’s v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. 
Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 92.  Id. at 947. 
 93.  Id. at 969-75. 
 94.  Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 
2012). 
 95.  Debating Mississippi’s “Personhood Amendment,” CBSNEWS (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:14 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-20126236/debating-mississippis-personhood-
amendment/. 
 96.  H.C. 44, 2011 Reg. Leg. Sess. (Miss. 2011), available at http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/
documents/2011/pdf/HC/HC0044IN.pdf. 
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being from the moment of fertilization, cloning or the functional 
equivalent thereof.”97  The goal of Mississippi’s Personhood 
Amendment was to establish that an unborn fetus is a person, thus 
resolving the question of when life begins and requiring the fetus be 
given Fourteenth Amendment protection.98 
The Personhood Amendment made no exceptions for abortion in 
the case of rape, incest, or saving the life of the mother, therefore 
making all abortions homicides.99  Opponents also believed that the 
amendment unconstitutionally encroached upon a woman’s reproductive 
choices because it could potentially limit in-vitro options and make the 
morning after-pill, a common hormonal contraceptive, illegal.100  But 
even in ultra-conservative Mississippi, a state with only one abortion 
clinic,101 the ballot was struck down by more than 55% of the voters.102 
Other states have proposed bills with goals and language similar to 
Mississippi’s Amendment 26.  Georgia’s pending SB 169 seeks to make 
it unlawful for any person to knowingly create an in-vitro human 
embryo by any means.103  South Carolina’s pending Senate Bill 450, 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-59 (1973) (“All this, together with our 
observation . . . that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion 
practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word ‘person’ as used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn . . . . Texas urges us that, apart from the 
Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, 
therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception.  We 
need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.  When those trained the respective 
discipline of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive an any consensus, the 
judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in the position to speculate as 
to the answer.”). 
 99.  H.C. 44, Laura Basset, As Mississippi Debates Extreme ‘Personhood’ Amendment, 
Advocates Ask Where Are The Dems?, HUFF POST POLITICS (Sept. 23, 2011, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/23/mississippi-abortion-personhood_n_976872.html. 
 100.  Mallory Simon, Mississippi Gov. Supports Amendment to Declare Fertilized Egg a 
Person, CNN (Nov. 7, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/04/us/mississippi-
personhood-amendment/index.html; Mississippi’s “Personhood Amendment” Fails at Polls, 
CBSNEWS (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:29 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-
57321126/mississippis-personhood-amendment-fails-at-polls/. 
 101.  JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION, http://gynpages.com/jwho/ (last visited 
October 16, 2012). 
 102.  Katherine Q. Seelye, Mississippi Voters Reject Anti-Abortion Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
8, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/us/politics/votes-across-the-nation-
could-serve-as-a-political-barometer.html; Aaron Blake, Anti-abortion ‘Personhood’ Amendment 
Fails in Mississippi, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/anti-abortion-personhood-amendment-fails-in-
mississippi/2011/11/08/gIQASRPd3M_blog.html. 
 103.  S.B. 169, Ga. Gen. Assemb. (Ga. 2012), available at http://www1.legis.ga.gov/
legis/2009_10/pdf/sb169.pdf. 
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also known as the “Life Beginning at Conception Act,” establishes that 
“the right to life for each born and preborn human being vests at 
fertilization, and that the rights of Due Process and Equal Protection, 
guaranteed by . . . the Constitution . . . vest at fertilization . . . .”104  
However, Senate Bill 450 has sat in the Senate since early 2010 with no 
action.105  In 2010, Colorado voted on Amendment 62, also a 
Personhood Amendment, which would make the term “person” apply to 
every human being from the beginning of the biological development of 
that human being.106  Amendment 62 would have banned abortion, many 
forms of birth control, and embryonic stem cell research in Colorado.107  
Although the bill made it to the ballot for voting, it failed by a 73-27 
margin.108 
In addition to Ohio’s attempted Heartbeat Bill, Ohio is mirroring 
Mississippi and Colorado by planning to introduce a personhood 
amendment that would effectively ban all abortions because a fertilized 
egg would be deemed a whole person.109  The proposed amendment 
would change the Ohio Constitution to define a person as including 
 
 104.  S. 450, S.C. 118th Sess. (S.C. 2012), available at 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/bills/450.htm. 
 105.  History of Legislative Actions, SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/bills/450.htm. (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). 
 106.  Lynn Barteis, Colorado “Personhood” Proposal’s 2010 Ballot Title, THE DENVER POST 
(Aug. 6, 2009, 01:00:00 AM), available at http://www.denverpost.com/politics/
ci_13001371?source=bbapproved. 
 107.  Cassandra Lopez, Kids Voting: Amendment 62 Defines Life as Beginning at Conception, 
THE DAILY SENTINEL (Oct. 24, 2010), available at http://www.gjsentinel.com/news/
articles/amendment_62_defines_life_as_b; Linn & Ari Armstrong, Am. 62 Would Ban the Pill, 
Endanger Women, GRAND JUNCTION FREE PRESS (Sept. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.gjfreepress.com/article/20100917/COLUMNISTS/100919972/1021&parentprofile=106
2. 
 108.  Joseph Boven, Personhood Amendment Slammed by Voters, THE COLORADO 
INDEPENDENT (Nov. 8, 2010), available at http://coloradoindependent.com/66224/personhood-
amendent-slammed-by-voters. 
 109.  Catherine Candisky, Proposed ‘Personhood’ Ballot Wording Approved, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/
01/10/proposed-personhood-amendment-ballot-wording-approved.html; What is the Ohio 
Personhood Amendment, PERSONHOOD OHIO, (2012), http://personhoodohio.com/about: 
The Ohio Personhood Amendment will read as follows: 
“Person” and “men” defined: 
(A) The words “person” in Article 1, Section 16, and “men” in Article 1, Section 1, apply to every 
human being at every stage of the biological development of that human being or human organism, 
including fertilization. 
(B) Nothing in this Section shall affect genuine contraception that acts solely by preventing the 
creation of a new human being; or human “eggs” or oocytes prior to the beginning of the life of a 
new human being; or reproductive technology or In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) procedures that respect 
the right to life of newly created human beings. 
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“every human being at every stage of biological development, including 
fertilization,” essentially criminalizing abortion.110  Florida and Montana 
are also planning on placing similar personhood amendments on their 
state ballots.111  Colorado is attempting to pass yet another constitutional 
amendment in 2012 that would make the definition of a “person” apply 
to “every human being regardless of the method of creation” and 
prohibits the “intentional killing of any person,” which includes birth 
control.112 
For now, Ohio’s pro-life efforts are focused on H.B. 125, the 
Heartbeat Bill.  The opening provisions of H.B.125 declare that 
according to “contemporary medical research,”113 a “fetal heartbeat has 
become a key medical predictor that an unborn human individual will 
reach viability and live birth.”114  The bill also declares “cardiac activity 
begins at a biologically identifiable moment in time.”115  The bill then 
mandates that a physician determine if the pregnant woman’s fetus “is 
carrying a detectable fetal heartbeat” prior to performing an abortion.116  
Using an ultrasound, this cardiac activity can be detected as early as six 
weeks.117 
If the physician does in fact detect cardiac activity, the physician is 
required to have the woman sign a form acknowledging that the “unborn 
human individual” has a “fetal heartbeat,”118 and the physician is 
prohibited from performing an abortion on the woman.119  Additionally, 
H.B. 125 does not contain a rape exception and only permits an abortion 
in the case of a “medical emergency,” defined as a condition that “so 
endangers the life of the pregnant woman or a major bodily function of 
the pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate performance or 
 
 110.  Aaron Marshall, Anti-abortion Activists Want to Bring ‘Personhood’ Fight to Ohio 
Ballot, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 2, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/
12/personhood_fight_may_be_coming.html. 
 111.  Mallory Simon, Mississippi Gov. Supports Amendment to Declare Fertilized Egg a 
Person, CNN (Nov. 7, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/04/us/mississippi-
personhood-amendment/index.html. 
 112.  Electra Draper, Colorado Group Launches Third Try for Personhood Amendment, 
DENVERPOST.COM (Nov. 21, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/
ci_19384073. 
 113.  Am. Sub. H.B. 125 § 2919.19(A), 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). 
 114.  Id. § 2919.19(A)(5). 
 115.  Id. § 2919.19(A)(6). 
 116.  Id. § 2919.19(C)(1). 
 117.  Concerns Regarding Early Fetal Development, AM. PREGNANCY ASSOC. (2008), 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/earlyfetaldevelopment.htm. 
 118.  H.B. 125 § 2919.19(D)(2)(a)&(b). 
 119.  Id. § 2919.19(E)(1). 
13
Knopp: The Heartbeat Bill
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 7 - KNOPP_DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2013  3:59 PM 
266 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:253 
inducement of an abortion.”120 
This Comment examines whether Ohio’s H.B. 125 is constitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment in the context of United States Supreme Court 
precedent on abortion. 
III. HOW H.B. 125 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FOURTEENTH 
AND FIRST AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A. H.B. 125 Violates a Woman’s Right to Privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Roe v. Wade121 is the bedrock Supreme Court decision addressing 
abortion.  In Roe, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 
a Texas law that prohibited abortion except for saving the life of the 
pregnant woman.122  In examining the constitutionality of the laws, the 
Court first decided whether a woman had a right to an abortion.123  
Although the Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution does not 
expressly state a right to privacy, the Court recognized that a right to 
privacy exists under the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty,124 and this liberty is broad enough to encompass a woman’s right 
to terminate her pregnancy.125 
However, a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy is not 
absolute because the State also has a compelling interest in safeguarding 
the health of the pregnant woman, seeking to maintain medical 
standards, and protecting prenatal life.126  The Court reasoned that the 
State’s interest in regulating abortion becomes compelling at the point of 
viability because that is when the fetus can presumably have meaningful 
life outside of the mother’s womb.127  Under Roe, viability was at the 
end of the first trimester of pregnancy.128  Therefore, prior to viability, a 
woman’s abortion decision was to be “free of interference by the 
 
 120.  Id. § 2919.19(B)(6). 
 121.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 122.  Id. at 113. 
 123.  Id. at 129. 
 124.  Id. at 153.  The Court also listed previous cases that guaranteed certain areas or zones of 
privacy from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 152-53. 
 125.  Id. at 153. 
 126.  Id. at 154. 
 127.  Id. at 163. 
 128.  Id. 
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State.”129 
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court wrestled with defining 
the parameters of abortion in a variety of contexts under the privacy 
right embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 1976, the Supreme 
Court in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,130 upheld 
an informed consent provision requiring written consent by the woman 
prior to having the surgical abortion procedure131 and struck down state 
laws requiring the consent of spouses132 and parents133 before an 
abortion procedure.  In 1979 in Belloti v. Baird,134 the Supreme Court 
again decided that minors need not receive parental consent prior to 
obtaining an abortion and gave states latitude for assessing whether 
minors were mature enough to elect an abortion procedure.135  In 1983, 
the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the informed consent 
provisions mandating the twenty-four hour waiting period and 
acknowledgment of certain information in Ohio’s City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health.136  That same year, in Planned 
Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft,137 the 
Supreme Court found unconstitutional a law requiring that abortions 
performed in the second trimester must be performed in a hospital, 
reasoning that the provision was similar to that in Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health.138 
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists,139 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a law that 
required pregnant women to hear a state-scripted speech designed to 
 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 131.  Id. at 52, 66-67. (The Missouri statute required “before submitting to an abortion during 
the first [twelve] weeks of pregnancy a woman must consent in writing to the procedure and certify 
that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion.”). 
 132.  Id. at 71-72. 
 133.  Id. at 74-75. 
 134.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 135.  Id. at 647-48.  The court concluded that every minor must have the opportunity—if she 
so desires—to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents.  If she satisfies 
the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on 
her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent.  If she fails to 
satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to 
show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests. 
 136.  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 137.  Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). 
 138.  Id. at 481-482. 
 139.  Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), 
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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deter them from having an abortion.140  In Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services,141 the Supreme Court upheld a state law that banned 
public employees from performing abortions, reasoning that the state 
need not commit any resources to facilitating abortions.142  In Rust v. 
Sullivan,143 the Supreme Court upheld a federal regulation prohibiting 
abortion counseling in clinics that receive federal funding,144 commonly 
referred to as the “gag rule.”145  Then, in 1992, the Supreme Court 
decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which overruled City of Akron v. 
Akron Productive Health and Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, and revisited Roe.  Casey provides the 
constitutional framework to analyze Ohio’s H.B. 125. 
In Casey, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of 
Pennsylvania’s abortion laws, which required that a woman seeking an 
abortion wait twenty-four hours prior to obtaining the procedure and be 
required to receive certain information designed to persuade her to 
choose live birth, among other restrictions.146  The Court revisited Roe, 
and the joint opinion determined that Roe’s essential holdings were 
reaffirmed.147  Therefore, under Roe and Casey, a woman still has the 
right to choose an abortion prior to viability, the State retains power to 
restrict abortion after fetal viability, and the State has a legitimate 
interest from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health and life of 
the fetus.148  In the joint opinion, the Court again recognized that a 
woman’s right to choose an abortion derives from her privacy right 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and this liberty is on a “rational 
continuum” which requires state laws that seek to limit that right to be 
carefully scrutinized.149  The Court again drew the viability line from 
 
 140.  Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 747-48. 
 141.  Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 142.  Id. at 509 (“[t]he State’s decision here to use public facilities and staff to encourage 
childbirth over abortion “places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to 
terminate her pregnancy,” citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).). 
 143.  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 144.  Id. at 175. 
 145.  Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summun, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 56-57 (2009); Nancy Pineles, Rust on the 
Constitution: Politics and Gag Rules, 37 HOW. L.J. 83 (1993). 
 146.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 147.  Id. at 846 (Joint opinion by O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter) (Stevens and Blackmun 
concurring and dissenting in part). 
 148.  Id. (Justice Blackmun opined in his concurrence and dissent that the joint opinion failed 
to recognize another essential holding of Roe v. Wade, which was the use of strict scrutiny in 
assessing a privacy right).  Id. at 929. 
 149.  Id. at 847-48. 
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Roe in Casey, stating, “the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy 
before viability is the most central principle of Roe.  It is a rule of law 
and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.”150 
Although the Supreme Court stated in Casey that Roe’s trimester 
framework was not unworkable,151 it transformed the Roe trimester 
analysis into an undue burden test.152  The Court reasoned that the 
trimester framework was not an essential holding of Roe, that informed 
consent provisions do not interfere with the privacy rights recognized in 
Roe, and the trimester framework undervalues the states’ interest in 
potential life.153  The Court then created the “undue burden” standard to 
analyze laws that seek to regulate abortion prior to viability.154 
Under Casey, an undue burden exists if its purpose or effect is to 
“place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion 
before the fetus attains viability.”155  If a statute places an undue burden 
on a woman seeking an abortion prior to viability, it is unconstitutional 
because at this point, the statute may not hinder “a woman’s free 
choice.”156  The Court also reaffirmed that “a State may not prohibit any 
woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy 
before viability,” with viability being recognized at twenty-eight weeks 
in Roe, or twenty-three to twenty-four weeks under Casey, recognizing 
that medical technology advances.157 
In contrast, Ohio’s H.B. 125 would seek to regulate abortion 
according to cardiac activity, which can occur as early as five to six 
weeks.158  This law would thus seek to regulate abortion prior to 
viability.159  Therefore, H.B. 125 is subject to the undue burden analysis 
under Casey.160  Under the undue burden test, if H.B. 125 seeks to place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to 
 
 150.  Id. at 871. 
 151.  Id. at 855. 
 152.  Id. at 876.  For more information on the undue burden standard, see Linda J. Wharton et. 
al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 317 (2006). 
 153.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 873. 
 154.  Id. at 876. 
 155.  Id. at 877-78. 
 156.  Id. at 877. 
 157.  See id. at 860. 
 158.  Concerns Regarding Early Fetal Development, AM. PREGNANCY ASSOC. (2008), 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/earlyfetaldevelopment.htm.  (Five and 
a half to six and a half weeks is usually a very good time to detect either a fetal pole or even a fetal 
heart beat by vaginal ultrasound). 
 159.  Am. Sub. H.B. 125 § 2919.19, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). 
 160.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
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viability, the statute is unconstitutional.161  Here, the substantial obstacle 
H.B. 125 would place in the path of a woman seeking an abortion is 
prohibiting the abortion after the detection of cardiac activity.  This 
obstacle is more than a mere obstacle; it is a state mandated decision 
because it entirely eliminates a woman’s right to choose.162  Because 
H.B. 125 makes the choice for the woman, H.B. 125 violates the undue 
burden test under Casey, thus making H.B. 125 unconstitutional.  
Furthermore, H.B. 125 is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it eliminates a 
woman’s right to privacy and choice declared constitutionally protected 
under Roe and Casey. 
Even in the context of the national push for pro-life legislation, 
H.B. 125 is a drastic bill because it completely eliminates a woman’s 
right to choose an abortion, in direct violation of forty years of Supreme 
Court precedent interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.  In the bill’s 
current form, there are only two ways it could be constitutional.  First, 
Ohio would have to overturn both Roe and Casey, thus eliminating a 
woman’s right to an abortion under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
therefore allowing the states to regulate and proscribe abortion.  Second, 
H.B. 125 could be constitutional by redefining the point of viability at 
the point of detectable cardiac activity.  Because both Roe and Casey 
hold that states are free to regulate or even proscribe abortion after 
viability,163 if medicine could establish that viability exists at the 
detection of cardiac activity, then states could arguably proscribe 
abortions as early as five to six weeks.  Roe even states that the point at 
which the state’s interest becomes compelling is determined “in light of 
present medical knowledge.”164 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth is an example 
of how one state sought to expand the definition of viability.165  In 
Danforth, a Missouri statute defined “viability” as “that stage of fetal 
development when the life of the unborn child may be continued 
indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive 
systems.”166  Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statute, 
arguing that this definition of viability was too broad under the 
 
 161.  See id. 
 162.  See id. 
 163.  Id. at 879; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). 
 164.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
 165.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976). 
 166.  Id. at 63. 
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definition of viability given under Roe,167 which specifically referred to 
viability as “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit 
with artificial aid,” and presumably capable of “meaningful life outside 
the mother’s womb.”168  The plaintiffs also stated that Missouri’s 
definition of viability amounted to a legislative determination of what is 
properly a matter for medical judgment.169  The Supreme Court upheld 
the definition of viability as constitutional in Danforth, stating it fit the 
parameters in Roe,170 and noted further viability is “a matter of medical 
judgment, skill, and technical ability, and we preserved the flexibility of 
the term.”171 
Therefore, because viability is a flexible term, if medicine could 
establish that viability now begins at an earlier point, such as when there 
is detectable cardiac activity, H.B. 125 could be constitutional.  
However, Danforth cautioned that it is not the function of the legislature 
or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at 
a specific point in the gestation period.172  The Court reasoned that the 
time when viability is achieved varies with each pregnancy, and the 
determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a 
matter for the judgment of the attending physician.173  The Danforth 
opinion suggests that if states seek to specifically define viability, the 
statute must allow for the physician to have some discretion. 
Given that viability is currently defined by case law as a fetus 
having meaningful life outside the womb and indicating respiratory 
function,174 contemporary medicine likely cannot establish, or ever 
establish, that viability of the fetus is as early as five to six weeks unless 
the definition of viability changes.  Additionally, H.B. 125, in its current 
form, does not attempt to redefine viability by the detection of cardiac 
activity but labels cardiac activity as a “medical predictor” that the fetus 
will reach viability.175  Furthermore, recognizing that abortions should 
be prohibited after an identifiable point in time because the fetus 
becomes a person, such as the detection of cardiac activity, implicates 
First Amendment issues. 
If H.B. 125 were a consent-only bill, it would be more likely to be 
 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-63. 
 169.  Danforth, 428 U.S. at 63. 
 170.  Id. at 64. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). 
 175.  Am. Sub. H.B. 125 § 2919.19(A)(5), 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). 
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constitutional.  A consent-only bill means that H.B. 125 would instead 
only require that the cardiac activity be detected and that the woman be 
informed of the detection of cardiac activity prior to having the abortion 
procedure.  To be a consent-only bill, H.B. 125 would not prohibit the 
woman from seeking an abortion if cardiac activity is in fact detected. 
Ohio has many mechanisms in place to ensure that a woman’s 
consent is fully informed prior to obtaining an abortion.  Under current 
Ohio law governing abortion, a woman seeking the procedure: must go 
to an abortion clinic at least twenty-four hours prior to the procedure;176 
receive information about family planning agencies that can assist the 
woman throughout her pregnancy, agencies that assist in adoption and 
agencies that offer medical assistance for prenatal, childbirth and 
neonatal care; and also receive information about support obligations 
from the father.177  The woman must then also receive information about 
the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the zygote, embryo, 
or fetus for various weekly increments throughout the pregnancy and 
information regarding the probable time at which the fetus becomes 
viable.178  After the woman receives all of this information, she is 
required to sign a consent form stating that she received all of these 
materials and she voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently consents to 
the abortion.179 
If H.B. 125 were enacted as a consent-only bill, the woman would 
also be required to acknowledge additional information.  Under H.B. 
125 the physician is required to determine whether the fetus has 
detectable cardiac activity.180  A physician determines whether there is 
cardiac activity by performing an ultrasound.181  Under Ohio law, if an 
ultrasound is performed at any time prior to the abortion, the physician 
must provide the pregnant woman the opportunity to view the active 
ultrasound image and offer to provide the woman with a physical picture 
of the ultrasound.182 
H.B. 125 would then additionally mandate that if a physician 
detects cardiac activity using the ultrasound, the physician would be 
required to inform the pregnant woman of the statistical probability of 
 
 176.  OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.56(B)(2) (West 2012). 
 177.  Id. § 2317.56(C)(1). 
 178.  Id. § 2317.56(C)(2). 
 179.  Id. § 2317.56(B)(3)(a)&(b). 
 180.  H.B. 125 § 2919.19(C)(4). 
 181.  Women’s Health Information: Ultrasound in Pregnancy, SOC’Y OF OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS OF CANADA (May 4, 2011), http://www.sogc.org/health/pregnancy-
ultrasound_e.asp. 
 182.  OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2317.561 (West 2012). 
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bringing the “unborn human individual” to term.183  Moreover, the 
pregnant woman would be required to sign a form acknowledging she 
received the information from the physician, understands the fetus has a 
“fetal heartbeat,” and is “aware of the statistical probability of bringing 
the unborn human individual . . . to term.”184  Therefore, if H.B. 125 
were enacted as a consent-only provision, a pregnant woman in Ohio 
would be required to sign two written consent forms, one regarding 
family planning materials and the other regarding fetal cardiac activity, 
be asked twice to see the ultrasound image of the fetus, and go to the 
clinic twice to comply with the twenty-four hour waiting period. 
H.B. 125’s supposed informed consent provisions must be analyzed 
in context of the parameters set forth in Casey.  Casey holds that states 
are free to pass regulations that express “a profound respect for the life 
of the unborn” if the regulations “are not a substantial obstacle of [a 
woman’s] right to choose.”185  Casey determined Pennsylvania’s statute 
mandating a twenty-four hour waiting period was not an undue burden, 
and therefore constitutional, because the waiting period ensured that the 
woman’s decision is “more informed” and “deliberate” and did not strike 
the Court as “unreasonable.”186  Casey also upheld the informed consent 
provisions requiring the woman be given information on the medical 
effects of abortion and information on childbirth, child support, and 
agencies that provide adoption, reasoning that these materials ensure that 
the woman apprehends the full scope of her decision.187 
However, the amount of information, the content of the 
information, and the two signed consent forms that Ohio would require a 
woman to sign if H.B. 125 were enacted into a consent-only law go 
beyond ensuring that the woman’s “decision is mature and informed” 
 
 183.  H.B. 125 § 2919.19(D)(2)(a). 
 184.  Id. § 2919.19(D)(2)(b). 
 185.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992). 
 186.  Id. at 885.  But see Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion, arguing that the twenty-four hour 
waiting period is coercive by wearing down the ability of the woman to exercise her constitutional 
right to an abortion and upholding the waiting period reflects the court’s belief that women are less 
capable of making major decisions without statutory deliberation periods, and the waiting period 
creates a presumption that the abortion decision is wrong.  Id. at 918.  Justice Steven’s stated the 
“State cannot presume a woman failed to reflect adequately merely because her conclusion differs 
from the State’s perspective.”  Id. at 919.  See also Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed 
Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223 (2009) (exploring the 
law’s failure to treat pregnant women as capable of making their own decisions concerning whether 
to have an abortion). 
 187.  505 U.S. at 881-82.  For further discussion on Planned Parenthood’s informed consent 
provisions, see FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY 122-24 (Tracy A. Thomas & Tracey Jean Boisseau eds., 
N.Y. Univ. Press 2011). 
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and expressing a “preference for childbirth over abortion”188 because 
this information also places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion prior to viability under the undue burden test.189  
Because the acknowledgment of all this information goes beyond mere 
persuasion, H.B. 125’s requirements in conjunction with Ohio’s current 
laws have the purpose of furthering the potential life of the fetus prior to 
viability and hinder the woman’s free choice to elect the procedure prior 
to viability.190 
Proponents of drastic informed-consent provisions argue laws like 
this are constitutional under Casey because the acknowledgement of this 
amount of information is just another state mechanism of ensuring the 
woman’s choice is truly informed.  Additionally, Casey makes clear that 
states are free to pass regulations that express a profound respect for the 
life of the unborn.191  Because this information can arguably be dubbed 
“informed consent” within the meaning of Casey, federal pro-life 
legislators are attempting to push a consent-only version of Ohio’s 
Heartbeat bill, arguing that the information does fall within legal 
informed consent provisions. 
In October 2011, Republican U.S. Representative Michele 
Bachmann introduced H.R. 3130 to Congress, commonly referred to as 
the “Heartbeat Informed Consent Act.”192  This Act would require: the 
woman receive an ultrasound prior to an abortion, ultrasound images be 
displayed for the woman to view while the ultrasound is being 
performed, and a medical description of the ultrasound images of the 
fetus’s cardiac activity be given.193  If the woman’s egg was fertilized at 
least eight weeks prior to the ultrasound procedure, then it is required 
that a fetal monitor be used to make the fetal heartbeat audible to the 
 
 188.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 883. 
 189.  See id. at 878. 
 190.  See id. at 877. 
 191.  See id. 
 192.  H.R. 3130, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011); Bachmann Introduces Pro-Life Heartbeat 
Legislation, BACHMAN.HOUSE.GOV (Oct. 6, 2011), http://bachmann.house.gov/News/
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=263425. 
 193.  H.R. 3130, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h112-3130 (enacting § 3402 “Requirement of 
Informed Consent (b)(1) Prior to a woman giving informed consent to having any part of an 
abortion performed, the abortion provider who is to perform the abortion, a certified technician, or 
another agent of the abortion provider who is competent in ultrasonography shall—(A) perform an 
obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant woman; (B) during the performance of the ultrasound, display 
the ultrasound images (as described in paragraph (2)) so that the pregnant woman may view the 
images; and (C) provide a medical description of the ultrasound images of the unborn child’s 
cardiac activity, if present and viewable.”). 
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woman.194 
The “findings” cited for the necessity of this bill are that “the 
presence of a heartbeat in a woman’s unborn child will be a material 
consideration to many women contemplating abortion,”195 “the presence 
of a heartbeat in a woman’s unborn child is a developmental fact that 
illustrates to the woman that her baby is already alive,”196 and “[a] fetal 
heartbeat is therefore a key medical indicator that an unborn child is 
likely to achieve the capacity for live birth,”197 among other reasons.  
The bill stresses that a woman must be made known of the fetal 
heartbeat because “ensuring full informed consent is imperative”198 and 
that the “State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well 
informed.”199  Representative Bachmann states, in support of her bill, “A 
pregnant woman who enters an abortion clinic is faced with a decision 
that will forever change two lives.  That’s why she must have the very 
best information with which to make that decision.”200 
Although requiring that a woman listen to a fetus’s cardiac activity 
is debatably an undue burden within the meaning of Casey, H.R. 3130 is 
closer to coming within constitutional bounds when compared to Ohio’s 
H.B. 125.  Unlike H.B. 125, H.R. 3130 does not mandate that upon 
detection of a fetal heartbeat the woman can no longer elect an abortion 
 
 194.  Id. (enacting § 3402(c)(1) “Requirement- Prior to a woman giving informed consent to 
having any part of an abortion performed, if the pregnancy is at least 8 weeks after fertilization (10 
weeks from the first day of the last menstrual period), the abortion provider who is to perform the 
abortion, a certified technician, or another agent of the abortion provider shall, using a hand-held 
Doppler fetal monitor, make the embryonic or fetal heartbeat of the unborn child audible for the 
pregnant woman to hear.”). 
 195.  Id. (enacting § 2 Findings. “The Congress finds as follows: (1) The presence of a 
heartbeat in a woman’s unborn child will be a material consideration to many women contemplating 
abortion.”). 
 196.  Id. (enacting §2(2)). 
 197.  Id. (enacting §2(6)). 
 198.  Id. (enacting §2(8)). 
 199.  Id. (enacting §2(8)). 
 200.  Michelle Bauman, Bachmann Introduces Heartbeat Informed Consent Act in Congress, 
NAT’L CATHOLIC REGISTER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/bachmann-
introduces-heartbeat-informed-consent-act-in-congress/.  In addition to Representative Bachman’s 
push for further regulation on women’s reproductive choices, other politicians are also challenging 
women’s reproductive rights.  For example, as the 2012 presidential election debates start, Rick 
Santorum, a previous senator from Pennsylvania and 2012 Republication presidential candidate, 
opposes insurance companies providing prenatal screening because providing the screens will 
allegedly lead to women having more abortions.  Santorum charges that the law requiring insurers 
to cover the tests is a way to encourage more women to have abortions that will “cull the ranks of 
the disabled in our society.”  For further reading see David Firestone, Rick Santorum and the 
Politics of Theology, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012, 12:37 AM), http://
loyalopposition.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/rick-santorum-and-the-politics-of-theology/. 
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procedure.  Because H.R. 3130 has an informed-consent approach and 
does not impose the state’s choice on the woman, it may be 
constitutional under Casey because hearing a fetal heartbeat arguably 
may not place a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
abortion.”201  Because H.R. 3130 seeks to persuade, albeit strongly 
persuade, the woman to choose a live birth over abortion and is 
“reasonably related” to accomplishing the goal of live birth, it may be 
constitutional.202  Therefore, if Ohio legislators want H.B. 125 to come 
closer to already established binding legal precedent, Ohio legislators 
should modify H.B. 125 to mirror H.R. 3130 to be a consent-only bill, 
although constitutional challenges surely still await under Casey’s undue 
burden test. 
Ultimately, in H.B. 125’s current form, it is unconstitutional under 
Casey and Roe because Ohio, the state, is placing a substantial obstacle 
before a woman seeking to obtain an abortion procedure by eliminating 
her right to choose an abortion under her privacy right derived from the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Further, H.B. 
125 also implicates First Amendment concerns in the way it seeks to 
regulate abortion at the point in time of detectable cardiac activity. 
B. H.B. 125 Violates Ohioans’ Right to be Free from State-Sponsored 
Religion under the First Amendment 
In addition to H.B. 125’s Fourteenth Amendment concerns, H.B. 
125 also implicates First Amendment concerns regarding the 
Establishment Clause.203  The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits Congress and the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment from passing laws that establish a national religion or from 
preferring one religion to another.204  The focus of the Establishment 
Clause is neutrality,205 and some members of the Supreme Court have 
asserted that this neutrality should take the form of a “wall of separation 
 
 201.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 202.  Id. at 877. 
 203.  See Martha A. Field, Abortion and the First Amendment, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 545, 551 
(1996) (acknowledging that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment can provide a 
foundation for access to abortion). 
 204.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally, Kamenshine, The First Amendment’s Implied 
Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1104-10, 1119-26 (1979) (arguing that the 
first amendment should be construed to prohibit government establishment of particular political 
ideology). 
 205.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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between church and State.”206 
Opponents to H.B. 125 believe that H.B. 125 establishes religious 
principles on Ohioans by placing the value of the life of the potential 
fetus above the life of the mother207 and by determining when a fetus 
becomes a person.208  The determination of when a fetus becomes a 
person implicates religious values both for people that believe life begins 
after cardiac activity and for people that believe life begins at the 
moment of conception.  While other First Amendment concerns arise in 
the abortion context,209 this Comment focuses on Supreme Court 
precedent addressing the establishment of religion by the state through 
its abortion laws and how that precedent affects H.B 125. 
In a series of cases addressing funding for abortion through state 
and federal medical plans, the Supreme Court routinely dismissed 
alleged Establishment Clause violations.  In Maher v. Roe,210 the 
Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut welfare regulation under which 
Medicaid recipients received payments for medical services related to 
 
 206.  March v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J. dissenting). 
 207.  See Opposition Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before 
the Ohio House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Rabbi Emily 
Rosenzweig, Ohio Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice), available at 
http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Rosenzweig.pdf; See Opposition Testimony 
to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Ohio House of Representatives, 
112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Allan Debelak, Pastor of Reedemer Lutheran Church in 
Columbus), available at http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Debelak.pdf. 
 208.  See Opposition Testimony to H.B. 125: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Committee on 
Health, Human Services, and Aging, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (Pastor David Meredith, Broad 
St. United Methodist Church), available at http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/
HB125_Meredith_121311.pdf. 
 209.  See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 830-31 
(1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (briefly 
addressing whether compelled speech on behalf of physicians violated the First Amendment); Rust 
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 174 (1991) (holding that regulations prohibiting abortion as a method of 
family planning in counseling do not violate First Amendment free speech rights by impermissibly 
imposing viewpoint-discriminatory conditions by Government subsidies); 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abortion 
and Birth Control § 79 (2012).  Another unreported effect of anti-abortion legislation is the effect it 
has on doctors willing to enter into the profession.  Lydia Strauss, the Supervisor of Support 
Services for Capital Care Women’s Center in Ohio, in a live interview, explained that the lack of 
physicians willing to perform abortions will soon be an epidemic.  Regardless of whether proposed 
pro-life legislation actually passes, it contributes to the overall body of media hype regarding 
abortions and deters physicians from entering the profession because of its controversy.  Ms. Straus 
stated that all of the abortion-providing physicians she works with in Ohio are older and seeking to 
retire soon, but there are no newer physicians that are willing to enter the practice.  Based upon Ms. 
Straus’s experience in the field, she believes that even if abortion remains legal in Ohio prior to 
viability, the lack of physicians willing to perform the procedure will be an epidemic soon. 
Interview with Lydia Strauss, Supervisor of Support Services for Capital Care Women’s Center in 
Ohio (Dec. 6, 2011). 
 210.  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
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childbirth but not for therapeutic abortions.211  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that unequal subsidization was permissible under Roe because 
the regulations did not place any obstacles in a pregnant woman’s path 
to an abortion.212  Additionally, the Court reasoned that while the 
regulation may effectuate Connecticut’s views on abortion, the 
regulations did not impose a restriction on access to abortion itself.213 
In Poelker v. Doe,214 the Supreme Court found no constitutional 
violation when the city of St. Louis decided as matter of policy to only 
provide hospital services for childbirth and not abortions in the public 
hospital setting.215  More recently in Harris v. McRae,216 the Court 
considered whether an amendment to the Social Security Act violated 
the First Amendment.217  The amendment prohibited the use of federal 
funds to reimburse people for abortions sought under Medicaid, absent 
some exceptions.218  Plaintiffs challenging the amendment argued that 
the amendment violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment because it incorporated views of the Roman Catholic 
Church about the sinfulness of abortion and the time at which life 
begins.219  The plaintiffs also argued that women seeking an abortion 
may also be doing so under Protestant and Jewish beliefs, and therefore 
the amendment violates the Free Exercise Clause by preventing a 
woman from exercising her religious beliefs.220 
Without conducting a lengthy analysis, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the First Amendment claims in Harris, reasoning that a statute 
does not violate the First Amendment because “it happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.”221  To illustrate its 
point, the Court reasoned “that [although] the Judeaeo-Christian 
religions oppose stealing [that] does not mean that a State . . . may not, 
consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting 
 
 211.  Id. at 464. 
 212.  Id. at 474. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Poekler v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
 215.  Id. at 521. 
 216.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 217.  Id. at 302-311. 
 218.  Id. at 302. 
 219.  Id. at 318-319. 
 220.  Id. at 311-19. 
 221.  Id. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)); see also Crossen 
v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833, 840 (6th Cir. 1971) (declining to address the argument that an 
abortion law “violates the establishment clause . . . in that it enacts as law the religious beliefs of 
certain groups not held by other persons.”). 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss1/7
ARTICLE 7 - KNOPP_DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2013  3:59 PM 
2013] THE HEARTBEAT BILL 279 
larceny.”222  The Court then categorized the amendment as a “reflection 
of traditionalist values towards abortion”223 that, without more, did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.224 
Maher, Poelker and Harris demonstrate how the Supreme Court 
rejects claims that the antiabortion statutes violate the Establishment 
Clause despite the role of religion in the abortion debate.225  However, 
H.B. 125’s religious concerns are distinguishable from Maher, Poelker, 
and Harris because the bill directly places an obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion.  Maher reasoned that although the funding 
allocation affected abortion, the funding itself did not place an obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, and therefore the regulation 
was constitutional under Roe.226  H.B. 125, however, is distinguishable 
because not only does it place an obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion, it seeks to make the decision for the woman, again 
raising the Fourteenth Amendment issues previously discussed.227 
Establishment of religion concerns was briefly touched upon in Roe 
and Casey.  Roe recognized that abortion must be a constitutional issue: 
One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the 
raw edges of human existence, one’s religious training, one’s 
attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the 
moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all 
likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions 
about abortion. . . . Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue 
by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of 
predilection.228 
Additionally, Casey recognized that people will always disagree 
about the “profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy” and recognized “[s]ome of us as individuals find abortion 
offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control 
 
 222.  Harris, 448 U.S. at 319. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 319-20. 
 225.  See John Morton Cummings Jr., The State, the Stork, and the Wall: The Establishment 
Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1217-1218 (1990); David R. 
Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479, 479 
(1990). 
 226.  Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
 227.  But see Scott C. Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the 
Establishment Clause, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that laws informed by 
religious moral premises generally do not, by that fact alone, violate the First Amendment). 
 228.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
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our decision.”229  The Court went on to state again that abortion is a 
constitutional, not a religious, issue.230  Additionally, the Court 
recognized that the only religious aspect that should be involved in the 
abortion decision is the woman’s own spirituality.231 
Opponents of H.B. 125 believe the bill violates the First 
Amendment because of the way it values the life of the fetus above that 
of the mother by equating the life of the fetus with the life of the 
mother.232  Jewish Rabbi Emily Rosenzsweig demonstrates that H.B. 
125 directly opposes the Jewish faith morally by the way it values the 
potentiality of the fetus above the health and welfare of the already 
living woman.233  In the Jewish faith, Exodus 21:22-23234 distinguishes 
the legal status of the fetus as less than that of the pregnant woman by 
assigning a financial penalty for the death of the fetus but a capital 
penalty for the death of the woman.235  Also, according to Jewish 
Babylonian Talmud Chullin 58a, rabbis are taught that the fetus is the 
thigh of its mother; the pregnant woman is the person, and the fetus is 
part of her body.236  Because H.B. 125 seeks to prevent a woman from 
having an abortion after the detection of cardiac activity absent only a 
medical emergency, it therefore equates the value of the woman’s life 
with the fetus, in direct contradiction to Jewish beliefs. 
People following a Christian-based faith also believe that H.B. 125 
encroaches into their religious beliefs and therefore constitutes an 
 
 229.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
 230.  Id. at 850 (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral 
code.”). 
 231.  Id. at 852 (“The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own 
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”). 
 232.  See e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Religious Coalition for Reprod. Choice et al. in 
Support of Respondent at 10, 21, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830) (arguing 
that Nebraska’s statute banning partial-birth abortion statute “has unconstitutionally imbedded into 
law certain religious beliefs over others” though framing the legal issue as one of “individual 
conscience”). 
 233.  Opposition Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the 
Ohio House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Rabbi Emily 
Rosenzweig, Ohio Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice), available at 
http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Rosenzweig.pdf. 
 234.  Exodus 21:22-23 ([]”If people are fighting and hit a pregnant woman and she gives birth 
prematurely[a] but there is no serious injury, the offender must be fined whatever the woman’s 
husband demands and the court allows. [] But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for 
life . . . .”). 
 235.  Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Ohio House 
of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Rabbi Emily Rosenzweig, Ohio 
Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice), available at http://www.ppao.org/Legislation/129th/
HB125/HB125_Rosenzweig.pdf. 
 236.  Id. 
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Establishment Clause violation.  For example, Methodist Pastor David 
Meredith provided opposition testimony on behalf of Methodists and 
does not support H.B. 125.237  The Book of Discipline of the United 
Methodist Church requires that Methodists be required to respect the life 
of the mother who may be severely damaged from an unacceptable 
pregnancy.238  Some members of the United Church of Christ also do not 
support H.B. 125 because it contradicts The Sixteenth General Synod of 
the United Church of Christ, which “uphold[s] the right of men and 
women to have access to adequately funded family planning services, 
and to safe, legal abortions as one option among others.”239  By 
prohibiting women from accessing these services, H.B. 125 would 
establish the parameters by which some Christians practice their faith in 
the abortion context. 
Pastor Allan Debelak of a Lutheran Church in Columbus, Ohio, 
states that the “sanctity of life” has so many meanings to the various 
Christian faiths and, to Lutherans, the “sanctity of life” means 
considering more “than the state of the fetus.”240  Reverend Robert 
Molsbury, the Conference Minister for the Ohio Conference of the 
United Church of Christ, perhaps sums up many of these Christians’ 
opponents views best by stating, “House Bill 125 reflects an extreme 
expression of Christianity that even I, a faithful, practicing Christian, 
would find oppressive if it were to be enacted into law.”241 
The specific language used in H.B. 125, suggesting that the life of a 
fetus begins at a certain point in time, also raises First Amendment 
Establishment Clause concerns.  Because America is home to many 
religions, religious diversity precludes a unanimous sectarian view of 
when life actually begins.242  In reflecting on the Texas abortion laws 
 
 237.  Testimony –Ohio: to H.B. 125: Senate Health, Human Services, and Aging Committee in 
Opposition to H.B. 125, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (Pastor David Meredith, Broad St. United 
Methodist Church), available at http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/
HB125_Meredith_121311.pdf. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Opposition Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B.125 before the 
Ohio House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Allan Debelak, Pastor 
of Reedemer Lutheran Church in Columbus), available at http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/
HB125_Debelak.pdf. 
 241.  Opposition Testimony to the Health & Aging Committee: Hearing on H.B. 125 before the 
Ohio Senate, 112th Congress 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Reverend Robert Molsberry, 
Conference Minister for the Ohio Conference of the United Church of Christ), available at 
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_Molsberry121311.pdf. 
 242.  Brief Amicus Curiae for American Jewish Congress at 11-17, Webster v. Reprod. Health 
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No.88-605).  Views regarding abortion defy unanimity, even within 
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that established life began at conception, Roe stated that the Court is not 
in a position to speculate “the difficult question of when life begins” 
because those trained in medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable 
to arrive at a consensus.243  For those reasons, in Roe and Casey, the 
Court drew the line at viability—the precise determination of when life 
begins is impossible to make in light of the varying religious views of 
Americans.  Furthermore, the viability-line is a constitutional and not 
religious line, and it allows states to prohibit abortions after viability 
because that is when the State’s interest in preserving life becomes 
compelling.244  Roe reasoned that viability is the appropriate line 
because “the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life 
outside the mother’s womb.”245 
Although H.B. 125 does not attempt to redefine viability by the 
moment of detectable cardiac activity,246 it seeks to proscribe abortion at 
a point in time much earlier than viability.  Some Christians take issue 
with this determination.  For example, Methodist Pastor Meredith 
believes that abortion is consistent with Christian principles in certain 
situations and that H.B. 125 seeks to unconstitutionally espouse certain 
Christian religious principles on others by making a blanket 
determination for all persons of when life begins.247  This determination 
also affects persons on the opposite spectrum, including religious pro-
life groups, who believe that life begins prior to detectable cardiac 
activity and prior to viability. 
For example, Ohio Right to Life (ORTL), Ohio’s largest and long-
serving pro-life non-profit, is a religious group that believes that a fetus 
is a person from the moment of conception and not at the point at which 
cardiac activity is detectable.248  ORTL routinely works with elected 
 
sects.  While many Roman Catholics reject abortion, some allow it under certain circumstances.  
Baptists generally consider their opposition to abortion as non-binding.  The Episcopal Church 
continues to support a woman’s right to have an abortion, as do the Presbyterians, who focus on 
viability.  Many Protestant theologians maintain that life does not begin at conception, as do many 
Jewish groups.  Id. 
 243.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
 244.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992); See John Morton 
Cummings Jr., The State, the Stork, and the Wall: The Establishment Clause and Statutory Abortion 
Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1234-1237 (1990). 
 245.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
 246.  Am. Sub. H.B. 125 § 2919.19(A)(5), 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). 
 247.  Opposition Testimony to H.B. 125: Hearing on H.B.125 before the Committee on Health, 
Human Services, and Aging, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011) (statement of Pastor David Meredith, 
Broad St. United Methodist Church), available at http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/
HB125_Meredith_121311.pdf. 
 248.  Ohio Right to Life Mission, OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.ohiolife.org/mission-and-
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officials to draft and pass laws that advocate for the fetus’s right to life 
and argues that the right to life is the most fundamental right of all 
Americans’ liberties and as “God’s creation.”249  ORTL does not support 
H.B. 125 in its current form because it is not a conception-based bill.  If 
H.B. 125 were a consent-only bill, thus requiring that the woman only be 
made known of the presence of a fetal heartbeat, then the organization 
would support the bill because it is requiring the woman to make a 
decision regarding an abortion based upon all the available 
information.250  However, ORTL’s position for nearly forty years has 
been that life begins at the moment of conception, not weeks later when 
the heartbeat begins.251  H.B. 125 therefore “represents a potential step 
backwards in the truth of the matter,”252 and determining that a fetus is a 
person at the point of cardiac activity, rather than conception, encroaches 
upon ORTL’s religious beliefs.253  Therefore, H.B. 125 implicates 
religious concerns for people on both sides of the spectrum—those that 
believe life begins earlier than cardiac activity and those that believe life 
begins later than cardiac activity—by defining a precise point in time at 
which a woman cannot have an abortion. 
The language in H.B. 125 referring to cardiac activity beginning at 
a biologically identifiable point in time also poses an Establishment 
Clause issue.  The Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
 
beliefs (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). 
 249.  Ohio Right to Life Mission:”Who We Are Video,” OHIO RIGHT TO LIFE, 
http://www.ohiolife.org/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2012) (“The right to life is the most 
fundamental of all our liberties as Americans and as God’s creation,” quote from Stephanie Krider, 
Ohio Right to Life Director of Legislative Affairs). 
 250.  Letter from Ohio Right to Life to Representative Wachtmann (May 6, 2011), available at 
http://ppao.org/Legislation/129th/HB125/HB125_ORTL120711.pdf. 
 251.  Letter from Ohio Right to Life to Chapter Leader (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohiolife.org/storage/Affiliated%20Chapter%20Letter.pdf. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Ohio Right to Life (ORTL) has voiced other concerns regarding H.B. 125.  ORTL 
understands the current Supreme Court case law does not support the bill and believes that a 
specific legal protocol must be followed in order to overturn Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood.  
The organization believes that if their pro-life legislation is not well timed it will be held 
unconstitutional because ORTL recognizes that members of the Supreme Court greatly affect the 
legislation’s success.  ORTL believes Justice Sotomayor and Kagan will not support the 
constitutionality of H.B. 125.  ORTL believes that if the Supreme Court is ready to hold 
constitutional a heartbeat bill, it is ready to hold constitutional a conception-based bill.  
Additionally, ORTL fears more binding precedent reaffirming Roe v. Wade that ORTL and other 
pro-life supporters will have to overcome in the future.  Lastly, ORTL believes that defending H.B. 
125 will exhaust much needed treasury money and will award thousands of Ohio taxpayer dollars to 
pro-choice organizations’ attorneys, thus ultimately supporting abortion.  Letter from Ohio Right to 
Life to Chapter Leader (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohiolife.org/storage/Affiliated%20Chapter%20Letter.pdf. 
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Services254 addressed similar language to that used in H.B. 125.  In 
Webster, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a series 
of Missouri state laws that sought to regulate abortion.  The preamble of 
Missouri’s law contained “findings” by the state legislature that “[t]he 
life of each human being begins at conception” and that “unborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.”255  In 
Webster, the Court of Appeals determined that Missouri’s declaration 
that life begins at conception was “simply an impermissible state 
adoption of theory of when life begins to justify its abortion regulations” 
and therefore unconstitutional.256  However, the Supreme Court 
determined that this was not an unconstitutional law because the 
language was in the statute’s preamble and merely expressed a “value 
judgment.”257  Because the preamble language was a value judgment and 
because of federalism concerns, the Court decided it was not empowered 
to decide “abstract propositions . . . for the government of future 
cases.”258 
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that absent a 
secular legislative declaration, the preamble was an Establishment 
Clause violation.259  Justice Stevens continued that the preamble is an 
“unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means 
all Christian faiths,” “serves no identifiable secular purpose,” and 
espouses Roman Catholic beliefs.260 
H.B. 125’s first section contains similar language to the preamble 
language of the Missouri statutes in Webster.  The first section of H.B. 
125 states, “Cardiac activity begins at a biologically identifiable moment 
in time, normally when the fetal heart is formed in the gestational sac”261 
 
 254.  Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 255.  Id. at 501. 
 256.  Id. at 503. 
 257.  Id. at 506. 
 258.  Id. at 506-07 (quoting Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 409 
(1900)). 
 259.  Id. at 566 (J. Stevens, dissenting). 
 260.  Id. at 566-569 (“As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state 
interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9-month-
gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth.  There can be no interest in protecting the newly 
fertilized egg from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffering does not 
yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however, that interest is valid.  In fact, if one prescinds the 
theological concept of ensoulment . . . a State has no greater secular interest in protecting the 
potential life of an embryo that is still “seed” than in protecting the potential life of a sperm or an 
unfertilized ovum.”). 
 261.  Am. Sub. H.B. 125 § 2919.19(A)(6), 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011). 
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and later prohibits abortions after the detection of this cardiac activity.262  
Like the Missouri statutes, H.B. 125 makes a precise determination of 
exactly when life begins for all persons by prohibiting abortions after the 
determination of cardiac activity.  The Supreme Court precedent in 
Webster suggests that this language may be a value judgment.  However, 
H.B. 125’s language is not labeled as a “preamble” but is a part of the 
statute itself.  In H.B. 125, the heading declares that the language 
underneath the section is based on “contemporary medical research,” 
perhaps in an attempt to provide a “secular purpose” to combat Justice 
Stevens’ dissenting concerns in Webster.  However, with the new 
makeup of the Supreme Court Justices, the Court may view H.B. 125’s 
language as more than a mere value judgment, as the court did in 
Webster, and instead as an Establishment Clause violation. 
Pre-viability prohibition of abortion is the product of religious 
beliefs that the detectable cardiac activity signifies the point in time in 
which life begins, co-mingling religious principles in a constitutional 
context.  But Casey specifically used the viability line as the point of 
prohibition because it is a fair, constitutional, and independent factor that 
is separated from diverging religious principles.263  H.B. 125 seeks to 
depart from this constitutionally-drawn line, therefore constituting an 
establishment of state-sponsored religion in violation of the First 
Amendment.264 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although Ohio has been at the forefront of informed consent 
provisions starting with the Supreme Court decision in Akron 
Reproductive Health, Ohio has gone one step too far with H.B. 125.  
Even in the context of a push regionally, nationally, and federally for 
pro-life legislation, H.B. 125 is not constitutionally sound.  Under 
Casey, H.B. 125 places an undue burden on a woman’s reproductive 
decision by completely eliminating her decision to choose abortion, in 
direct violation of her right to privacy derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of liberty.  Even if H.B. 125 were enacted as a 
consent-only bill, it still arguably places an undue burden in the path of a 
 
 262.  Id. § 2919.19(C)(1). 
 263.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870-71 (1992) (“Consistent with 
other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity 
of offering a justification.  But courts may not.  We must justify the lines we draw . . . . The viability 
line also has . . . an element of fairness . . . .”). 
 264.  See David R. Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 479, 499 (1990). 
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woman seeking an abortion under Casey because it would require a 
woman to acknowledge an extensive amount of information prior to 
exercising her constitutionally protected right to an abortion. 
Additionally, H.B. 125 violates Ohioans’ First Amendment right to 
be free from state-sponsored religion by valuing the potential life of the 
fetus over the mother and making a blanket determination for all 
Ohioans when life begins and is worth protecting.  In the midst of 
Ohio’s efforts to push the pro-life agenda, Ohio legislators must take a 
step back and evaluate the constitutionality of the provisions they seek to 
impose, reflecting on over forty years of Supreme Court precedent 
addressing the very issue, and in light of the Fourteenth and First 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
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